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► The present paper investigated the congruity between victims' and perpetrators' need for apologies
► A mismatch between victims' and perpetrators' need for apologies is observed
► This mismatch is driven by the intentionality of the transgression
► This effect was mediated by anger (victims) and guilt (perpetrators)
► This mismatch has consequences for actual apology behavior and subsequent forgiveness
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Although previous research on apologies has shown that apologies can have many beneﬁcial effects on victims'
responses, the dyadic nature of the apology process has largely been ignored. As a consequence, very little is
known about the congruence between perpetrators' willingness to apologize and victims' willingness to receive
an apology. In three experimental studies we showed that victimsmainlywant to receive an apology after an in-
tentional transgression, whereas perpetrators want to offer an apology particularly after an unintentional trans-
gression. As expected, these divergent apologetic needs among victims and perpetrators were mediated by
unique emotions: guilt among perpetrators and anger among victims. These results suggest that an apology
serves very different goals among victims and perpetrators, thus pointing at an apology mismatch.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Apologizing is an effective and widely supported response to
transgressions (Cohen, 1999; Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Kellerman,
2006; Meijer, 1998; Tavuchis, 1991; Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011).
From an early age, people learn to apologize when they are re-
sponsible for a transgression (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). Victims of
transgressions are, in turn, socialized into graciously accepting such
apologies (Bennett & Dewberry, 1994; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). The pro-
cess where apologies lead to reconciliation is known as the “apology–
forgiveness cycle” (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991).
The apology–forgiveness cycle is collectively rational because nor-
mative prescriptions for perpetrators to apologize and for victims to
respond with forgiveness help to preserve social relationships after
conﬂict. Whether these normative prescriptions actually describe an
empirical reality is a question that prior research has largely failed
to address. The apology–forgiveness cycle seems to assume (at least
implicitly) that victim and perpetrator are both motivated to recon-
cile. However, empirical studies show that victims and perpetrators
often differ in their interpretations of critical aspects of transgres-
sions, such as who is responsible for the transgression, its signiﬁcance
and its long-term effects (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990;
Feeney & Hill, 2006; Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, & Heimgartner,
1998). If interpretations of conﬂict differ so much between victim and
perpetrator, then are their views on the need for apologies congruent?
In this paper, we suggest that different emotions underlie the vic-
tims' and perpetrators' need for apologies: anger for the victims and
guilt for the perpetrators. Since these emotions serve different functions
and are activated by different types of situations, victims' and perpetra-
tors' need for apologies may often be mismatched. This mismatch, we
argue, can have important consequences for subsequent forgiveness
and reconciliation between victim and perpetrator.
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Need for apologies among victims and perpetrators
An apology is generally deﬁned as a combined statement of an ac-
knowledgement of wrongdoing and an expression of guilt (Lazare,
2004; Smith, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). Since communicating such senti-
ments implies that the perpetrator believes that the transgression
should not have happened and should not happen again, apologies
also represent an implicit promise that the transgression will not be re-
peated (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Smith, 2008). Apologies, therefore,
imply that perpetrators distance themselves from their prior actions
and admit being wrong. The effectiveness of apologies in promoting
trust and forgiveness among victims has been supported by a wealth
of research (see e.g., Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; De
Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi,
Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011).
It is important to note that apologies have rather different meanings
for victims and perpetrators, and they fulﬁll different psychological
needs. According to the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel
& Nadler, 2008), transgressions deprive victims and perpetrators of dif-
ferent psychological needs. Victimsmay experience feelings of inferior-
ity and anger in response to transgressions (Miller, 2001; Shnabel &
Nadler, 2008). Perpetrators may suffer from fear of exclusion (Exline
& Baumeister, 2000), and may therefore experience guilt (Baumeister,
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Apologies provide a means for address-
ing these impaired needs (De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer,
2010; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). However, as victims and perpetrators
require different needs to be restored, apologies serve a different func-
tion for either party.
For victims, apologies represent a compensation for having been vic-
timized; a symbolic compensation for the injury suffered due to the of-
fense (Tavuchis, 1991), and thus apologies address the state of inequity
that arises when people are transgressed against (Exline et al., 2007).
Anger is an emotion that is closely linked to a need for compensation
and retribution (Darley & Pittman, 2003). We therefore expect that
anger, which is central to the experience of injustice and victimization
(Miller, 2001), drives victims' need for apologies. To our knowledge,
no research has directly tested whether anger predicts a victim's need
for apologies. However, there is some indirect evidence that supports
this link. Anger has been linked to reconciliation attempts (Fischer &
Roseman, 2007): a negative emotional reaction towards the perpetrator
still leaves the possibility for reconciliation open. Since an apology is a
reconciliation tool, one would expect that victims' need for apologies
is positively related to anger.
For perpetrators, apologies are means for distancing themselves
from theirmisdeeds (Goffman, 1971), and for restoring the relationship
with the victim (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002; Leunissen, De Cremer, &
Reinders Folmer, 2012). We believe that guilt may play a central role
in the process that makes perpetrators apologize. Perpetrators may ex-
perience guilt in response to having committed an interpersonal trans-
gression because such a transgression poses a threat to the relationship
between the victim and perpetrator (Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge,
2012). The emotion of guilt, which is strongly related to the motivation
to reconcile and improve the relationship with the victim (Baumeister
et al., 1994), is likely to be central to the perpetrators' perception of
the need for apologies. One would therefore expect that the guiltier
the perpetrators feel, the more likely they will apologize.
In sum, apologies provide a means to fulﬁll the different needs of
victims and perpetrators in the aftermath of transgressions. However,
are the victim's and perpetrator's respective needs for apologies neces-
sarily aligned with each other, as suggested by the apology–forgiveness
cycle? Or in other words, are apologies provided by perpetrators
when they are required by victims? We suggest that this may not
be the case. Since the necessity of apologies for victims and perpe-
trators is linked to different emotions, we suggest that the need for
apologies may often be mismatched: apologies are given when vic-
tims require them least, and not when they require them most.
This notion is best exempliﬁed by considering the role of the inten-
tionality of transgressions.
Intentionality
Intentionality refers to an individual's desires, beliefs, awareness,
and abilities to perform a particular action (Malle & Knobe, 1997;
Malle & Nelson, 2003). An act is regarded as intentional if the actor
sets out to perform the action and succeeds. In the case of transgres-
sions, this means that the actor has willfully harmed the victim. Inten-
tionality is of particular interest for the present research because it is a
central element in the experience of transgressions and injustice.
Perceptions of intentionality inﬂuence attributions of culpability and
blameworthiness for transgressions, and people's tendency to respond
to them with forgiveness or retribution (Darley & Pittman, 2003;
Fincham, 2000; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008).
Importantly, intentionality has also been shown to inﬂuence the emo-
tions that underlie victims' and perpetrators' apology needs, namely
anger and guilt (McGraw, 1987). Therefore, intentionality may reveal
when victims' and perpetrators' need for apology do or do not align.
How may intentionality affect the emotions that underlie the vic-
tims' and perpetrators' need for apology, and, consequently, their per-
ceptions of that need? Intentional transgressions indicate that the
harm suffered by the victim was due to the perpetrator (rather than
to external circumstances). Hence they evoke more feelings of injustice
(Darley & Pittman, 2003; Miller, 2001) and anger than unintentional
transgressions do (Berkowitz & Heimer, 1989; Betancourt & Blair,
1992; Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, & Evans, 1998; Quigley &
Tedeschi, 1996). Indeed, the relationship between the intentionality of
the transgression and anger is one of the best-established ﬁndings in
the justice literature (Miller, 2001). Intentional transgressions conse-
quently lead to a victim having a stronger desire for compensation
and retribution (Darley & Pittman, 2003). As such, it is likely that vic-
tims desire an apology particularly after intentional transgressions.
For perpetrators, the intentionality of a transgression is closely
linked to guilt, being particularly experienced by perpetrators after
unintentional transgressions (McGraw, 1987). According to Baumeister
et al. (1994), there are two important sources of guilt. First, guilt is expe-
rienced as a result of anxiety for social exclusion. After an unintentional
transgression, a valuable relationship is distorted beyond the perpe-
trators' will, as such, the perpetrator experiences anxiety over social ex-
clusion as the victim might decide to end the relationship with the
perpetrator. This anxiety results in feelings of guilt (Baumeister et al.,
1994). When a perpetrator transgresses intentionally, the relationship
with the victim is less likely to be important to him/her and relational
deterioration is more likely to have been anticipated and considered
acceptable. Thus, the perpetrator experiences less anxiety for social
exclusion.
Intentionality also has important consequences for feelings of guilt
because the former inﬂuences the empathy that perpetrators feel to-
wards the victim. In the case of an intentional transgression, perpetra-
tors are aware beforehand that they will commit the transgression
(i.e., it is expected; McGraw, 1987). The perpetrator thus has had time
to rationalize the transgression beforehand, thereby guarding him/
herself against feelings of guilt (Baumeister, 1999; Tsang, 2002). In con-
trast, unintentional transgressions come unexpected to the perpetrator.
Therefore, he/she does not have any rationalizations ready to guard
him/herself against feelings of guilt. In short, these processes, anxiety
for social exclusion and rationalizations, suggest that perpetrators will
experience guilt particularly after unintentional transgressions and as
a consequence, will want to apologize particularly after unintentional,
rather than intentional transgressions.
In sum, these arguments lead us to predict a mismatch between the
victims' and the perpetrators' need for apology. Because victims and
perpetrators may desire apologies after different types of transgres-
sions, this apology mismatch could have important consequences for
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reconciliation after different types of transgressions. Because perpetra-
tors ultimately decide whether to apologize or not, it seems likely that
apologies will be issued mainly after unintentional transgressions as
perpetrators have the highest need to apologize after unintentional
transgressions. In contrast, this mismatch would also suggest that vic-
tims are unlikely to receive apologies for transgressions for which
they particularly desire apologies, namely intentional transgressions.
Because apologizing has been shown to have positive effects on forgive-
ness (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Ohbuchi et al.,
1989), it stands to reason that unintentional transgressions are forgiven
more often than intentional transgressions.
The present paper
The aim of the present paper is to study the incongruence between
perpetrators' willingness to apologize and victims' desire to receive an
apology and the subsequent effects of this incongruence on reconcilia-
tion. We argue that the emotional processes that underlie the victims'
and perpetrators' respective needs for apologies — that is guilt on the
part of perpetrators and anger on the part of victims—may not be com-
plementary, and as a consequence victims and perpetrators desire an
apology at very different instances. We suggest that intentionality,
which is uniquely associated with each of the above-mentioned emo-
tional process, may reveal this mismatch. This incongruence in turn
may have important consequences for forgiveness after the transgres-
sion.We tested these predictions in three studies. Study 1was an initial
test of our ideas using an autobiographical narrative task, similar to the
task designed by Baumeister et al. (1990). In study 2, we introduced
another manipulation of perspective and intentionality relying on a
vignette methodology. In study 3, we again relied on autobiographical
narrative tasks but this time we also included measures of actual apol-
ogy behavior and forgiveness after the transgression in order to explic-
itly show the effects of the mismatch both on needs for apologies and
behavior and subsequent forgiveness.
Study 1
Method
Participants and design
In total, 202 undergraduates (97 women, M(age)=20.00, SD(age)=
1.72) participated in return for course credit. Participantswere randomly
assigned to a 2 (perspective: victim vs. perpetrator)×2 (intentionality:
intentional vs. unintentional transgression) between-subjects design.
Procedure
Participants were asked to recall an intentional or unintentional
transgression of which they were either a victim or a perpetrator.
Victims were asked: Please recall a situation in which somebody else
did something (unintentionally/intentionally) to you that you experienced
as unpleasant or unjust. Perpetrators were asked: Please recall a situation
in which you did something (unintentionally/intentionally) that this other
person experienced as unpleasant or unjust.Next, participantswere asked
towrite a small paragraph describing the transgression. Afterwards, we
assessed our manipulation check, mediating variables, and dependent
variable.
Measures
All questions were answered on a 1 (= not at all), to 7 (= very
much) scale.
Manipulation check
We checked our intentionality manipulation in the autobiograph-
ical narratives by asking “To what extent was it the other's/your in-
tention to do something unpleasant or unjust?”
Mediating variables
Weasked participants in the victim conditions: “Howangrywere you
after this other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” and partici-
pants in the perpetrator conditions: “How guilty did you feel after you
did something unpleasant or unjust?”
Dependent variable
We assessed the need for an apology with (victim): “To what ex-
tent did you want to receive an apology from this other person?”
and (perpetrators). “To what extent did you want to offer an apology
to this other person?”
Results
In all the analyses of Studies 1, 2, and 3, categorical predictors
were effect-coded (unintentional=−1, intentional=1; victim=−1,
perpetrator=1).
Manipulation check
A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as inde-
pendent variables revealed a main effect of perspective (b=− .51,
t(198)=−4.54, pb .001) and a main effect of intentionality (b=.92,
t(198)=8.15, pb .001). The interaction effect was not signiﬁcant
(b=− .16, t(198)=−1.38, p=.17). Participants in the unintentional
conditions perceived transgressions as less intentional (M=2.22,
SD=1.46) than participants in the intentional conditions (M=4.05,
SD=1.88). Moreover, victims (M=3.65, SD=1.93) perceived the
transgression as more intentional than the perpetrators did (M=
2.65, SD=1.77).
Need for apologies
A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as inde-
pendent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b=− .26,
t(198)=−2.09, p=.04), but not of perspective (p=.62). The main
effect of intentionality showed that the need for apologies was gener-
ally higher after unintentional (M=5.32, SD=1.66) than after inten-
tional (M=4.81, SD=1.99) transgressions.
More importantly, this effect of intentionality was qualiﬁed by
the predicted interaction between perspective and intentionality
(b=− .41, t(198)=−3.25, p=.001; for cell means, see Table 1).
Planned comparisons revealed that after an unintentional trans-
gression, perpetrators were more willing to apologize than victims
desired an apology (b=.47, t(198)=2.63, p=.009). Conversely,
when the transgressionwas intentional, victims desired an apology sig-
niﬁcantly more than perpetrators were willing to apologize (b=− .35,
t(198)=−1.96, p=.05). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more
after an unintentional transgression than after an intentional transgres-
sion (b=− .68, t(198)=−3.76, pb .001). For victims, we did not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant difference in the need for apologies after intentional and
unintentional transgressions (b=.15, t(198)=.83, p=.41).
Mediation analyses
We hypothesized that speciﬁc emotions (i.e., anger on the part of
the victim and guilt on the part of the perpetrator) would mediate the
relationship between intentionality and willingness to give/receive an
apology. We only measured anger among victims and guilt among
Table 1
Means (SD) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 1.
Need for apologies Anger Guilt
Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator
Unintentional 4.86 (1.77) 5.81 (1.39) 5.00 (1.46) 5.81 (1.14)
Intentional 5.16 (1.85) 4.46 (2.08) 5.67 (1.53) 5.04 (1.79)
Note: anger was only measured among victims; guilt was only measured among
perpetrators.
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perpetrators. We thus split our sample into victims and perpetrators
and analyzed separately whether these speciﬁc emotions mediate the
effect of intentionality on willingness to give/receive an apology. Medi-
ation was tested using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes (2012),
using 5000 bootstrap resamples. The reported conﬁdence intervals are
bias-corrected bootstrap conﬁdence intervals of the probability distri-
bution of the indirect effect.
Victims. A regression analysis revealed a signiﬁcant (total) effect of
intentionality on anger (b=.33, t(100)=2.25, p=.03): victims were
angrier after intentionally transgressions than after unintentional trans-
gressions. We also obtained a signiﬁcant positive effect of anger on the
willingness to receive an apology (b=.52, t(100)=4.87, pb .001).
Finally, the indirect effect of intentionality on the willingness to receive
an apology, via anger, was signiﬁcant (b=.17, S.E. = .10, 95% CI
(two-sided): [.03; .42]), while the direct effect was not signiﬁcant
(b=− .03, S.E.=.17, t(99)=− .16, p=.87). This analysis shows that
there is an indirect effect of intentionality through anger on thewilling-
ness to receive an apology.
Perpetrators. Our analysis obtained a signiﬁcant (total) effect of inten-
tionality on guilt (b=− .39, t(98)=−2.55, p=.01), meaning that
perpetrators felt less guilty after intentional than after unintentional
transgressions. Guilt also signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the willingness to
offer an apology (b=.88, t(98)=10.31, pb .001). Moreover, the total
indirect effect of intentionality on apologies through guilt was signiﬁ-
cant (b=− .32, S.E.=.13, 95% CI (two-sided): [−1.19; − .1]). The di-
rect effect of intentionality on need for apologies was also signiﬁcant
(b=− .36, S.E.=.13, t(97)=−2.69, p=.008). This analysis thus sup-
ports our prediction that perpetrators are more willing to offer an apol-
ogy after an unintentional transgression than after an intentional one
because they feel guiltier in the former instance than in the latter one.
Discussion
Study 1 was largely in line with our predictions. Perpetrators
wanted to apologize after unintentional transgressions more than
after intentional ones. This effect was mediated by guilt. Moreover, we
found evidence for our proposed mismatch in the sense that perpetra-
tors wanted to apologize signiﬁcantly more than victims wanted to re-
ceive an apology after unintentional transgressions, while perpetrators
wanted to apologize signiﬁcantly less than victimswanted to receive an
apology after intentional transgressions. We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
difference between the intentional and unintentional conditions for
victims (although the mean difference was in the predicted direction).
However, the indirect effect of intentionality on victims' need for
apologies, mediated by anger, was signiﬁcant, showing that for victims,
the need for apologies is predicted by anger.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to extend the ﬁndings of Study 1. To experi-
mentally control the type of transgression, we employed a scenario
study in which participants were either the victim or the perpetrator
of the same transgression. Moreover, we wanted to provide a more
stringent test of the emotional processes that underlie this mismatch.
While Study 1 revealed that the relationship between intentionality
and need for apologies is mediated by anger (victims) and guilt (perpe-
trators), we were unable to rule out that anger could also play a role in
the perpetrators' willingness to apologize, and that guilt could inﬂuence
a victims' desire for apologies. To show conclusively that anger medi-
ates only the victims' need for apology, and that guilt mediates only
for perpetrators, we measured both emotions in both the victim and
perpetrator conditions in Study 2.
Method
Participants and design
A total of 248 undergraduate students (126 women, M(age)=
19.68, SD(age)=1.94) participated in exchange for course credit.
They were randomly assigned to a 2 (perspective: victim vs. perpetra-
tor)×2 (intentionality: intentional vs. unintentional transgression)
between-subjects design.
Procedure
Participants were presented with a short scenario. The scenario for
the victimswas (manipulation betweenbrackets): Imagine the following
situation. Your colleague (accidentally/intentionally) breaks your coffee
mug by pushing it off your desk. You were very fond of this coffee mug.
For the perpetrator, the scenario was: You (accidentally/intentionally)
break your colleague's coffee mug by pushing it off your colleague's desk,
causing it to break. Your colleague was very fond of this coffee mug. After
the participants read the scenario, we assessed the manipulation
checks, mediators, and the dependent measure.1
Measures
All questions were answered on a 1=not at all to 7=very much
scale.
Manipulation check
We checked our manipulation of intentionality with the following
item: “To what extent was it (your intention/the intention of your
colleague) to break the coffee mug?”
Anger and guilt
We measured anger in both perspectives by asking: “How angry
would you feel about your mug being broken?” Guilt was measured
in both perspectives by asking: “How guilty would you feel about
your mug being broken?”
Need for apology
The need for apology was measured by asking perpetrators: “To
what extent would you want to offer an apology to your colleague?”,
and victims: “To what extent would you want to receive an apology
from your colleague?”
Results
Manipulation check
A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as inde-
pendent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b=1.57,
t(244)=14.01, pb .001) and a main effect of perspective (b=− .37,
t(244)=−3.26, p=.001). The interaction effect was not signiﬁcant.
Participants in the unintentional conditions perceived transgressions
as less intentional (M=1.46, SD=.87) than participants in the inten-
tional conditions (M=4.69, SD=2.25). Moreover, victims (M=3.25,
SD=2.31) perceived the transgression as more intentional than per-
petrators did (M=2.57, SD=2.34).
Need for apologies
A regression analysis with intentionality and perspective as inde-
pendent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b=− .24,
t(244)=−2.64, p=.009), but not of perspective (p=.42). The
main effect of intentionality showed that the need for apology was
1 A potential methodological problem of the current scenario is that participant ﬁnd
it hard to imagine the scenario happening. We included a measure for how well the
participant could imagine the scenario from happening: “How hard was it for you to
imagine the described situation?” (1=not at all, 7=very much). We included this item
as a control variable in our moderated multiple mediation model. Including this control
variable did not signiﬁcantly change the results of our analysis, the indirect effects
through anger for victims and guilt for perpetrators were still signiﬁcant.
318 J.M. Leunissen et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 315–324
Author's personal copy
generally higher after unintentional (M=5.96, SD=1.31) than after
intentional (M=5.79, SD=1.55) transgressions.
More importantly, the effect of intentionality was qualiﬁed by the
predicted cross-over interaction between perspective and intention-
ality (b=− .46, t(244)=−5.00, pb .001; see Table 2 for cell means).
Planned comparisons revealed that after an unintentional transgres-
sion, perpetrators were more willing to apologize than victims desired
an apology (b=.39, t(244)=3.00, p=.003). Conversely, when the
transgression was intentional, victims desired an apology more than
perpetrators were willing to apologize (b=− .53, t(244)=−4.07,
pb .001). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more after an
unintentional transgression than after an intentional transgression
(b=− .71, t(244)=−4.66, pb .001). Victimswanted to have an apology
more after an intentional than after an unintentional transgression
(b=.22, t(244)=2.07, p=.04).2,3
Anger
Regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as inde-
pendent variables and anger as dependent variable revealed main ef-
fects on anger of perspective (b=− .22, t(244)=−3.50, pb .001) and
intentionality (b=.19, t(244)=2.97, p=.003). After a transgression,
victims were angrier (M=4.11, SD=1.93) than perpetrators (M=
3.30, SD=1.83), and both were angrier after intentional transgres-
sions (M=4.36, SD=2.01) than after unintentional ones (M=3.37,
SD=1.72). These effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction ef-
fect (b=− .21, t(244)=−3.34, p=.001). Simple effects analyses
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) indicated that the intentionality
of the transgression signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced anger among victims
(b=.40, t(244)=5.52, pb .001) but not among perpetrators (b=− .02,
t(244)=− .22, p=.82). Victims were angrier than perpetrators after in-
tentional transgressions (b=− .43, t(244)=−4.78, pb .001), but equally
angry after unintentional transgressions (b=− .001, t(244)=− .11,
p=.91).
To test whether anger indeed predicts the victims' need for an
apology but not the perpetrators', we conducted a regression analysis
with anger and perspective as independent variables and need for an
apology as the dependent variable. We obtained a signiﬁcant main ef-
fect of anger (b=.65, t(244)=7.20, pb .001), but no signiﬁcant main
effect of perspective (b=.07, t(244)=.81, p=.42), or a signiﬁcant
interaction (b=.005, t(244)=.05, p=.96).
Guilt
A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as predic-
tor variables and guilt as dependent variable yielded a signiﬁcant
main effect of perspective (b=.42, t(244)=6.81, pb .001), indicating
that after a transgression, perpetrators felt guiltier (M=4.98, SD=
1.92) than victims (M=3.19, SD=1.95) did.We did not obtain a signif-
icant main effect of intentionality (b=− .10, t(244)=−1.55, p=.12),
and also no signiﬁcant interaction effect (b=− .10, t(244)=−1.66,
p=.10). Simple effects analyses indicated that intentionality only af-
fected guilt among perpetrators (b=− .20, t(244)=−1.95, p=.05),
and not among victims (b=.006, t(244)=.09, p=.93). Hence, al-
though the interaction term is not signiﬁcant, the simple slopes analyses
show a pattern on guilt consistent with our hypotheses. Nevertheless,
these results should be interpreted with caution.
To test whether guilt predicts perpetrators', rather than victims'
need for an apology, we conducted a regression analysis with guilt
andperspective as independent variables and the need for apology as de-
pendent variable. We obtained a main effect of guilt (b=.28, t(244)=
6.21, pb .001) and of perspective (b=−1.46, t(244)=−6.56, pb .001).
Importantly, we also obtained the predicted interaction effect between
guilt and perspective (b=.28, t(244)=6.12, pb .001). Simple effects
analyses indicated that guilt only predicted perpetrators' need for apolo-
gies (b=.56, t(244)=7.47, pb .001), but not the need for apologies
among victims (b=.003, t(244)=.07, p=.94).
Mediation
Mediation was tested using the PROCESS macro developed by
Hayes (2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples. The reported conﬁ-
dence intervals are bias-corrected bootstrap conﬁdence intervals of
the probability distribution of the indirect effect.
We tested ourmodel by using intentionality as the independent var-
iable, anger and guilt as mediators in parallel, need for apologies as de-
pendent variable and perspective as moderator, moderating the path
from intentionality to anger and to guilt. In line with our hypotheses,
we obtained for victims a signiﬁcant indirect effect of anger (b=.24,
S.E. = .06, 95% CI (two-sided): [.15; .38]) but not of guilt (b=− .001,
S.E. = .02, 95% CI (two-sided): [− .03; .04]). For perpetrators, we
obtained a signiﬁcant indirect effect of guilt (b=− .04, S.E. = .03, 95%
CI: [− .12; − .0007]), but not of anger (b=− .01, S.E. = .07, 95% CI
(two-sided): [− .15; .12]). While the conditional direct (unmediated)
effect of intentionality on victims' need for apologieswas not signiﬁcant
(b=− .05, S.E. = .09, t(240)=− .50, p=.62), it was for perpetrators'
apology needs (b=− .51, S.E. = .13, t(240)=−3.86, pb .001). The
total effect of intentionality on the need for apologies was not signiﬁ-
cant (b=− .06, t(246)=− .93, p=.35).
Discussion
The results of Study 2 are consistent with our mismatch hypothesis.
Victims have a signiﬁcantly higher need for apologies than perpetrators
after intentional transgressions, while perpetrators have a signiﬁcantly
Table 2
Means (SD) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 2.
Need for apologies Anger Guilt
Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator
Unintentional 5.71
(1.46)
6.49 (.64) 3.38
(1.75)
3.34 (1.70) 3.17
(1.94)
5.39 (1.66)
Intentional 6.15
(1.24)
5.08 (1.85) 4.91
(1.80)
3.25 (1.97) 3.20
(1.98)
4.55 (2.10)
2 In this study, we included ameasure of harm severity: (perpetrators) “Towhat extent
would you feel that you harmed your colleague?”; (victims) “To what extent would you
feel that you are harmed by your colleague?” (both are on a 1=not at all, to 7=verymuch
scale). A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as independent variables
and harm severity as dependent variable indicated a signiﬁcantmain effect of perspective
(b=.68, t(242)=6.62, pb .001), intentionality (b=.56, t(242)=5.45, pb .001), and a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between perspective and intentionality (b=− .27, t(242)=−2.63,
p=.009). The main effect of perspective indicated that perpetrators (M=4.36,
SD=1.54) considered that they harmed the victim more severely than victims felt that
they were harmed (M=2.98, SD=1.71). Moreover, intentional transgressions (M=
4.11, SD=1.71) were generally perceived as more harmful than unintentional transgres-
sions (M=2.80, SD=1.60). The interaction effect indicated that only victims differed in
their perceptions of harm severity depending on the intentionality of the transgression:
they considered intentional transgressions (M=3.84, SD=1.76) signiﬁcantly (b=.82,
t(242)=7.03, pb .001) more harmful than unintentional transgressions (M=2.19,
SD=1.21). Perpetrators considered intentional (M=4.65, SD=1.48) and unintentional
(M=4.07, SD=1.56) transgressions equally (b=.29, t(242)=1.73, p=.09) harmful.
We added harm severity both as a covariate and as an extra mediator in our moderated
multiple mediation model. For neither of the perspectives was the indirect effect through
harm severity signiﬁcant. Moreover, in both analyses, a signiﬁcant indirect effect through
anger and guilt remained. These analyses show that harm severity does not explain our
effects.
3 An alternative explanation for why perpetrators are less willing to apologize after in-
tentional than after unintentional transgressions is that perpetrators might fear that their
apologywill be rejected by the victimparticularly after an intentional transgression. In or-
der to test this alternative explanation,wemeasuredwhether fear of rejection of the apol-
ogy was a concern to perpetrators with “Would you feel worried that your colleague
might reject your apology in this situation?” (1=not at all, 7=completely). A regression
analysis with intentionality as independent variables did not show a signiﬁcant main ef-
fect of intentionality. Hence, our data do not provide evidence that perpetrators weremo-
re worried about an apology being rejected after intentional compared to unintentional
transgressions. Moreover, inclusion of this item in as an extra mediator did not indicate
a signiﬁcant indirect effect through this fear of rejection item, while the indirect effect
through guilt was still signiﬁcant.
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higher need for apologies than victims after unintentional transgres-
sions. Moreover, we ﬁnd that guilt only mediates the relationship be-
tween intentionality and need for apologies for perpetrators, while
anger mediates only the victims' need for apologies.
Two ﬁndings were not in line with our hypotheses. First we did
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant interaction effect between anger and perspec-
tive on the need for apologies, meaning that in this study anger was
predictive for the need for apologies for both victims and perpetra-
tors. This might just result from testing the same effect across multi-
ple studies. Even if an effect exists objectively, statistical logic dictates
that some replication attempts will not show the effect (Schimmack,
in press). A more substantial post-hoc explanation for this ﬁnding re-
lates to the speciﬁc nature of this study. Speciﬁcally, perpetrators may
have interpreted this question as being angry at themselves for the
coffee mug being broken. This would be in line with our ﬁnding of a
positive effect of anger on the willingness to apologize of perpetra-
tors. A second ﬁnding that was not in line with our hypotheses was
that, although guilt mediated the relationship between intentionality
and need for apologies for perpetrators, there was still a signiﬁcant
direct (i.e., unmediated) effect of intentionality on the need for apol-
ogies. This ﬁnding suggests that other mechanisms, besides guilt, may
also play a role in the effects of intentionality on the willingness to
apologize. Moral disengagement might be a likely mechanism, such
as victim derogation.
Study 3
We conducted Study 3 to test whether the results of Studies 1 and 2
can be generalized to a different population (i.e., working adults). This
would strengthen the relevance and scope of the mismatch between
victim's and perpetrator's need for apologies. A second reason for
conducting Study 3 is our aim to gain more insight into actual apology
behavior and subsequent forgiveness. As explained in the introduction,
apologies generally lead to forgiveness (e.g.,McCullough et al., 1997). As
such, we predicted that the transgressionwouldmore likely be forgiven
after an apology than when no apology is given. Because apologies are
more likely to be offered after unintentional than after intentional trans-
gressions, this would also imply that unintentional transgressions are
more likely to be forgiven than intentional transgressions.
Method
Participants and design
A total of 383 working adults (286 women, M(age)=37.36,
SD(age)=10.5) were recruited through an online research participa-
tion scheme of a European distance-learning university. They partici-
pated for course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to a
2 (victim vs. perpetrator)×2 (intentional vs. unintentional transgres-
sion) between-subjects design.
Procedure
This study was conducted on the Internet and we used the same
instructions as for the autobiographical narratives in Study 1, but in
this case, we asked the participants to recall a transgression from
their own workplace.
Measures
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all measured were answered on a 1=
not at all, to 7=very much scale. The manipulation check and the
need for apologies were measured in the same way as in Study 1.
Anger and guilt were measured for both victims and perpetrators. In
order to measure anger, we asked: “How angry were you after you/
this other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” To measure
guilt, we asked: “How guilty did you feel after you/this other person
did something unpleasant or unjust?”
Apology behavior. To measure whether an apology was issued or not
after the transgression, we asked victims: “Did you receive an apology
from this other person?”, and we asked perpetrators: “Did you offer
an apology to the other person?” The answer scale was dichotomous:
Yes or No.
Forgiveness. To check whether the transgressions were eventually for-
given or not, we asked victims: “I have forgiven the other person for
what he/she did.” and perpetrators: “The other has forgiven me for
what I did.”
Results
Manipulation check
A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as inde-
pendent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b=3.27,
t(379)=5.89, pb .001). The main effect of perspective was not signif-
icant (p=.45). Participants in the unintentional conditions perceived
transgressions as less intentional (M=1.81, SD=1.43) than partici-
pants in the intentional conditions (M=3.54, SD=2.10). We also
obtained an interaction between intentionality and perspective
(b=−1.03, t(379)=−2.93, p=.004). This effect revealed the inten-
tionality manipulation to be stronger among victims (M(intentional)=
4.35, SD=1.94; M(unintentional)=2.11, SD=1.49) than among perpe-
trators (M(intentional)=2.72, SD(intentional)=1.94; M(unintentional)=1.51,
SD(unintentional)=1.32). Nevertheless, both victims (b=2.24, t(379)=
9.02, pb .001) and perpetrators (b=1.21, t(379)=4.90, pb .001) rated
the intentional transgressions as clearly being more intentional than
the unintentional transgressions. Our hypotheses imply variations in
the direction of the effect of intentionality for victims versus perpetra-
tors. Hence, we do not consider these results for the manipulation
check to be problematic because they indicate variations in the strength
of an effect that is in the same direction for victims and perpetrators.
Content coding of the perpetration stories
As an additional manipulation check for the perpetrator condi-
tions, we had all the perpetrator stories of Studies 1 and 3 (the two
autobiographical narrative studies) coded by a coder blind to the
original conditions and our hypotheses. An additional 20 percent
was coded by a second coder to check for inter rater reliability.
The storieswere coded in four categories, in linewith the categoriza-
tion of Darley and Pittman (2003): accidental, negligent, reckless, and
intentional. In addition to this forced-choice categorization, we also
had the coders rate each story on a 1 to 7 scale on the extent to which
the transgression was accidental, negligent, reckless or intentional. A
Chi-square analysis on the categorization of the transgression stories
between the two coders showed a highly signiﬁcant relationship be-
tween the two coders (χ2(9)=126.23, pb .001). Correlations between
the Likert scales were all high: accidental: r=.86, pb .001; intentional:
r=.92, pb .001; negligent: r=.79, pb .001; reckless: r=.74, pb .001.
Of the stories, 74were coded as accidental, 164were coded as inten-
tional, 24 were coded as negligent and 14 were coded as reckless; 16
were uncodable. These 16 cases were omitted from further analyses.
This left a total of 276 cases. Of the stories written in the intentional ex-
perimental conditions, 85% was coded as intentional, 1% was coded as
accidental, 3% was coded as negligent and 4 % was coded as reckless.
Of the stories written in the unintentional conditions, 52% was coded
as accidental, 25%was coded as intentional, 15%was coded as negligent
and 6% was coded as reckless. Excluding those participants whose
stories were not in line with the experimental condition (e.g. described
an intentional transgression in the unintentional condition), did not
change the data patterns presented hereafter.
Need for apologies
A regression analysis with intentionality and perspective as inde-
pendent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b=− .26,
320 J.M. Leunissen et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 315–324
Author's personal copy
t(379)=−2.55, p=.01) and perspective (b=− .32, t(379)=−3.11,
p=.002). The main effect of intentionality showed that the need for
apologies was generally stronger after unintentional (M=4.52,
SD=2.08) than after intentional (M=4.00, SD=2.14) transgres-
sions. The main effect of perspective indicated that victims (M=
4.60, SD=2.08) generally had a stronger need for apologies than per-
petrators (M=3.89, SD=2.21).
More importantly, we also obtained the predicted interaction
between perspective and intentionality (b=− .58, t(379)=−5.64,
pb .001; see Table 3 for cell means).
Planned comparisons revealed that victims wanted to receive an
apology more after an intentional than after an unintentional transgres-
sion (b=.32, t(379)=2.18, p=.03). Perpetrators wanted to give an
apology more after unintentional than after intentional transgressions
(b=− .84, t(379)=−5.80, pb .001). In line with the mismatch hypoth-
esis, we found that perpetrators were somewhat more willing to apolo-
gize than victims desired an apology after an unintentional transgression
(b=.26, t(379)=1.74, p=.08). Although, the pattern in is the hypothe-
sized direction, the difference is not signiﬁcant and should be interpreted
with caution. Conversely, when the transgression was intentional,
victims desired an apology signiﬁcantly more than perpetrators were
willing to apologize (b=− .90, t(379)=−6.40, pb .001).
Anger
A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as inde-
pendent variables and anger as dependent variable revealed main
effects on anger of perspective (b=− .56, t(379)=−13.33, pb .001)
and intentionality (b=.15, t(379)=3.72, pb .001). After a transgres-
sion, victims were angrier (M=5.45, SD=1.40) than perpetrators
(M=3.19, SD=1.90), and both were angrier after intentional (M=
4.61, SD=2.00) than after unintentional transgressions (M=3.98,
SD=1.99). These effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction
effect (b=− .08, t(379)=−1.93, p=.05). Simple effects analyses indi-
cated that victims were signiﬁcantly angrier after intentional than
unintentional transgressions (b=.24, t(379)=3.99, pb .001). We did
not ﬁnd any effect on anger among perpetrators (b=.07, t(379)=
1.27, p=.21).
To test whether anger indeed predicts the need for an apology for
victims but not for perpetrators, we conducted a regression analysis
with anger and perspective as independent variables and need for
an apology as the dependent variable. We obtained a signiﬁcant inter-
action of anger and perspective (b=− .50, t(379)=−5.67, pb .001).
A simple effects analysis indicated that anger only predicted the need
for an apology for victims (b=.59, t(379)=5.99, pb .001), and not for
perpetrators (b=− .10, t (379)=−1.44, p=.15). We also obtained a
main effect of anger (b=.24, t(379)=3.97, pb .001), indicating that
participants generally perceived a greater need for apologies as they
became angrier.
Guilt
A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as predic-
tors and guilt as dependent variable yielded signiﬁcant main effects
of perspective (b=.48, t(379)=10.74, pb .001) and intentionality
(b=− .11, t(379)=−2.40, p=.02). After a transgression, perpetrators
felt guiltier (M=4.04, SD=1.96) than victims (M=2.15, SD=1.58),
and both felt guiltier after unintentional (M=3.33, SD=2.11) than
after intentional transgressions (M=2.89, SD=1.91). These effects
were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction effect between perspective
and intentionality (b=− .13, t(379)=−2.99, p=.003; see Table 3
for cell means). Simple slopes analyses indicated that perpetrators
felt guiltier after unintentional than after intentional transgressions
(b=− .24, t(379)=−3.81, pb .001). We found no effect on guilt
among victims (b=.01, t(379)=.47, p=.64).
To test whether guilt predicts the need for an apology for perpe-
trators but not for victims, we conducted a regression analysis with
guilt and perspective as independent variables and need for an apol-
ogy as dependent variable. We obtained the predicted interaction ef-
fect between guilt and perspective (b=.40, t(379)=9.15, pb .001).
Simple slopes analyses indicated that guilt only predicted the need
for apologies for perpetrators (b=.77, t(397)=12.47, pb .001), and
not for victims (b=− .13, t(379)=−1.71, p=.09). We also obtained
a main effect of guilt (b=.32, t(379)=6.49, pb .001), indicating
that participants perceived a greater need for apologies as they felt
guiltier.
Mediation analyses
Mediation was tested using the PROCESS macro developed by
Hayes (2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples. Like in the previous
studies, the reported conﬁdence intervals are bias-corrected boot-
strap conﬁdence intervals of the probability distribution of the indi-
rect effect.
We tested ourmodel by using intentionality as the independent var-
iable, anger and guilt as mediators in parallel, need for apologies as de-
pendent variable and perspective as moderator, moderating the paths
from intentionality to anger and to guilt and the paths from anger to
need for apologies and guilt to need for apologies. In line with our hy-
potheses, for victims, we obtained a signiﬁcant indirect effect of anger
(b=.14, S.E. = .04, 95% CI (two-sided): [.07; .22]) but not of guilt
(b=− .003, S.E. = .008, 95% CI (two-sided): [− .03; .008]). For per-
petrators, we obtained a signiﬁcant indirect effect of guilt (b=− .18,
S.E. = .05, 95% CI (two-sided): [− .28; − .08]), but not of anger
(b=− .01, S.E.= .01, 95% CI (two-sided): [− .04; .008]). The condition-
al direct (unmediated) effect of intentionality on need for apologies for
victims was not signiﬁcant (b=− .03, S.E.= .12, t(382)=.28, p=78),
while the conditional direct effect for perpetrators was signiﬁcant
(b=− .41, S.E.=.11, t(382)=−3.63, pb .001). The total effect of inten-
tionality on the need for apologies was also signiﬁcant (b=− .12,
t(381)=−2.43, p=.02).
Need for apologies predicting apology behavior
One of the reasons to conduct Study 3 was to investigate the be-
havioral implications of the apology mismatch. As explained in the in-
troduction, because perpetrators have the highest need for apologies
and unintentional transgressions and perpetrator ultimately decide
whether to apologize our not, we expected that a perpetrator's need
for apologies would be predictive of whether an apology was issued
or not. A logistic regression analysis with perspective and need for
apologies as independent variables and apology behavior as depen-
dent variable indicated a main effect of need for apologies (b=1.19,
Wald=56.24, pb .001) and perspective (b=.45, Wald=11.35,
p=.001). We also found a signiﬁcant interaction between need for
apologies and perspective (b=−1.75, Wald=30.51, pb .001),
showing that need for apologies was only predictive for whether an
apology was issued for perpetrators (b=2.06, Wald=59.73,
pb .001), but not for victims (b=.31, Wald=3.36, p=.07).
Intentionality predicting apology behavior
Because perpetrators have the highest need for apologies after
unintentional transgressions, we expected that apologies are mainly is-
sued after unintentional transgressions. A logistic regression analysis
with perspective and intentionality as independent variables and apol-
ogy issued as dependent variable yielded a main effect of intentionality
Table 3
Means (SD) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 3.
Need for apologies Anger Guilt
Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator
Unintentional 4.26
(2.04)
4.78 (2.10) 4.94
(1.56)
3.03 (1.91) 2.09
(1.45)
4.56 (1.95)
Intentional 4.89
(1.88)
3.10 (2.00) 5.89
(1.07)
3.33 (1.89) 2.20
(1.69)
3.59 (1.87)
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(b=1.15, Wald=14.53, pb .001). Neither the effect of perspective nor
the interaction effect was signiﬁcant.
Because in logistic regression analysis lower order “main effects”
are contingent upon the interaction term (Jaccard, 2001), we tested
a model without the interaction term between perspective and inten-
tionality. This analysis showed that compared to unintentional trans-
gressions, the chance of an apology being issued after an intentional
transgression becomes signiﬁcantly smaller (b=1.18, Wald=29.04,
pb .001, odds ratio=3.25): the likelihood of an apology being issued
after an intentional transgression is signiﬁcantly less than 50%
(b=− .94, Wald=35.84, pb .001, odds=.39, percentage likelihood
28%). After an unintentional transgression, the likelihood of an apology
being issued was equivalent to an apology not being issued at all
(b=.24, Wald=2.47, p=.12, odds=1.27, percentage likelihood
56%).
Effect of apologies on forgiveness
As previous research has shown that apologies aid in being forgiv-
en, we expected that perpetrators who apologized would be forgiven
more than perpetrators who did not apologize. A regression analysis
with apology issued (effect coded: no=−1; yes=1), perspective,
and intentionality as independent variables and forgiveness as
dependent variable showed a signiﬁcant main effect on forgiveness
of apology issued (b=.81, t(375)=8.81, pb .001), of intentionality
(b=− .27, t(375)=2.93, p=.004), and of perspective (b=− .21,
t(375)=−2.33, p=.02). Transgressions were generally forgiven
more after an apology was issued (M=5.92, SD=1.36) than if an
apology was not issued (M=4.2, SD=1.90); unintentional transgres-
sions are generally forgiven more (M=5.44, SD=1.71) than inten-
tional transgressions (M=4.44, SD=1.94); and victims indicated
they had forgiven the perpetrator more (M=4.99, SD=1.86) than
perpetrators indicated that they were forgiven (M=4.83, SD=
1.94). Neither the two-way interactions nor the three-way interac-
tion were signiﬁcant (p>.25).
Discussion
The results of Study 3 extend our model in a number of ways. First,
we replicated our previous ﬁndings in a different population (i.e., em-
ployees). Second, in line with our model, we could also show that the
mismatch has consequences for actual apology behavior and subse-
quent forgiveness. Whether an apology is issued or not is predicted by
the perpetrator's need for apologies and not by the victim's needs.
Indeed, since the perpetrator's need for apologies is higher after un-
intentional transgressions than after intentional ones, apologies were
issued more often after unintentional than after intentional transgres-
sions. This also means that victims are unlikely to receive an apology
when they have a high need for an apology and that the victim's need
for an apology is not taken into account by the perpetrator when decid-
ing whether to apologize or not. Finally, we were able to show that the
apology mismatch has consequences for whether perpetrators are for-
given or not. Perpetrators are forgiven more when they apologize. As
such, unintentional transgressions are forgiven more than intentional
transgressions.
General discussion
We showed across three studies that perpetrators and victims
have different needs for apology, depending on the intentionality of
the transgression. Victims have a stronger preference for an apology
after intentional transgressions than after unintentional ones. This ef-
fect is mediated by anger: victims become angrier after intentional
than after unintentional transgressions, and therefore desire apolo-
gies more. For perpetrators, intentionality affects the need for apology
in the opposite direction: perpetrators prefer to apologize after un-
intentional than after intentional transgressions, partly because they
feel guiltier after unintentional transgressions. Moreover, in Study 3
we showed that apologies are indeed issued more after unintentional
than after intentional transgressions; behavior that is in line with the
perpetrator's need for apologies but has no relationship to the
victim's need for apologies. An apology in turn does lead to more for-
giveness by the victim, as such perpetrators are forgiven more after
unintentional than after intentional transgressions.
In the introduction of this paper, we argued that the apology–
forgiveness cycle may not always represent an empirical reality as
the victim's and perpetrator's perspectives on transgression are so di-
vergent. Our ﬁndings highlight that the initiation and success of the
apology–forgiveness cycle is highly dependent on the intentionality of
the transgression. Perpetrators are particularly motivated to initiate
the apology–forgiveness cycle by apologizing after unintentional trans-
gressions. As such, unintentional transgressions are forgivenmore often
than intentional ones. However, in these situations (i.e., unintentional
transgressions) victims are not very angry. Hence, the increased for-
giveness after unintentional transgressions seems to be a joint effect
of an apology and a relatively mild emotional reaction on the part of
the victim. In situations where victims experience the greatest injustice
and particularly desire apologies — after intentional transgressions —
perpetrators are far less likely to apologize. Yet, after intentional trans-
gressions, a victim's need for apologies seems to have little inﬂuence on
whether an apology is issued or not. Indeed, in these situations, the ab-
sence of an apology may even increase victims' anger (Ohbuchi et al.,
1989). This in turn increases the risk of further escalation of the conﬂict.
As such, intentional transgressions pose the greatest challenge for
mediation and reconciliation initiatives because of the strong emotional
reactions of victims combined with very incongruent reconciliatory
motivations of the perpetrator.
It is interesting to note that although we ﬁnd that victims generally
want an apology more after intentional than after unintentional trans-
gressions, related research on the effects of apologies paradoxically
shows that that apologies may be of little value or even be counterpro-
ductive after intentional transgressions (Struthers et al., 2008). As such,
victims particularly desire an apology after intentional transgressions
but at the same time, apologies seem tohave limited impact in those sit-
uations. What is a possible explanation for these incongruent ﬁndings
regarding the need for apologies and the actual effect of apologies on
victims after intentional transgressions? One potential explanation
may be found in the role of forecasting errors in the apology process,
whereby victims believe that they will be content if they receive an
apology, but when they have actually received one, are less satisﬁed
than they thought they would be (De Cremer et al., 2010). These ﬁnd-
ings again demonstrate the challenge of reconciliation after intentional
transgressions: even when victims receive an apology after an inten-
tional transgression (i.e., the perpetrator initiates the cycle), this may
not necessarily mean that the apology is reciprocated with forgiveness.
The role of guilt in the perpetrator's willingness to apologize
Our studies showed a clear connection between feelings of guilt and
the perpetrator's willingness to apologize after interpersonal transgres-
sions. This is in line with recent conceptualizations of guilt, which have
stressed the interpersonal effects of guilt, arguing that guilt motivates
people to take relationship-restoring action (Baumeister et al., 1994;
Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Our ﬁndings connect well with this research,
showing that indeed apologies as a tool for reconciliation are predicted
by feelings of guilt. Focusing on the relationship between guilt and
apologies therefore seems to be a promising avenue for future research
on apologizing.
In this context, it is also important to distinguish guilt form other
emotional reactions that perpetrators may feel after a transgression,
such as compassion or sympathy. Guilt can arise when a people feel
causally responsible for the harm inﬂicted upon the victim (Baumeister
et al., 1994). As such, guilt differs from feelings of compassion or
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sympathy,whichmay arisewhen someone sees a victim suffer (i.e., from
a third party perspective; Gayannée, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & Martinot,
2008; Regan, 1971). Guilt only arises when people feel personally re-
sponsible for the harm.
In the current set of studies, we showed that feelings of guilt have
an important inﬂuence on the perpetrator's willingness to apologize.
The emergence of guilt in a perpetrator is however complex. For in-
stance, in this research we showed that the intentionality of the
transgression is an important predictor for feelings of guilt. Some-
times, however, transgressions are not easily categorized as either in-
tentional or unintentional, having both intentional and unintentional
characteristics. Since the premeditated nature of intentional transgres-
sions provides the perpetrator with an opportunity to guard him/
herself against feelings of guilt by means of a priori rationalizations
(e.g., Tsang, 2002), it seems likely that unanticipated effects of trans-
gressions will make a perpetrator feel guilty. For instance, intentionally
throwing a friend into the pool during a party probably does not make
the perpetrator feel guilty as thiswas a premeditated act. However, sup-
pose the friend unbeknownst had his new mobile phone in his pocket,
which then broke as a result of getting wet. This unexpected effect of
the transgression is likely to make the perpetrator feel guilty. Indeed,
depending on the rationalizations and foreseen effects of an intentional
transgression, the perpetrator may feel guilty for speciﬁc aspects of the
transgression and may decide to either apologize or not.
In the present studies, we focused on guilt experienced directly after
the transgression. However, when taking a longer time frame, the rela-
tionship between intentionality and guilt may become more complex.
Perpetrators may guard against feelings of guilt with certain ratio-
nalizations. However, it seems likely that some of those rationalizations
are reinterpreted later by the perpetrator and then deemed inadequate.
As such, intentional transgressionsmay have the potential to cause guilt
at a later time. Since these rationalizations are not present with
unintentional transgressions, we would predict that in the long run,
perpetrators may feel guiltier about intentional than unintentional
transgressions, and if given the choice, would want to apologize more
for something they had done intentionally than for something they
had done unintentionally. It could therefore be that the apology
needs of victims and perpetrators become more aligned longer
after the conﬂict. How long this may take is of course open to empir-
ical investigation.
Strengths and limitations
One of the strengths of the present research is the use of a combi-
nation of different methodologies for answering our research ques-
tions. We combined scenario methodology, which gives control over
the transgression and thus increasing internal validity (Aronson,
Wilson, & Brewer, 1998), with autobiographical narrativemethodology,
which is more emotionally involving and has a higher ecological
validity (Baumeister et al., 1990; Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen, 1992;
Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). In addition to this pluralistic methodo-
logical strategy, we sampled both students and employees to test the
generalizability of our results. The fact that we showed similar ﬁndings
across these different methodologies and populations increases our
conﬁdence in the proposed mismatch between victims' and perpetra-
tors' need for apologies.
A possible limitation of the present study is that we cannot be
certain whether the task of remembering a victim episode is signiﬁ-
cantly different from remembering a perpetrator episode. Previous
research comparing these perspectives also mentions this limitation
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1990). Participants might have had self-
presentational concerns, selecting episodes that present themselves
rather positive in their role of a considerate victim (after an un-
intentional transgression) or a misunderstood perpetrator (after an in-
tentional transgression). Yet, given that we ﬁnd the same effects across
different types of methodologies (i.e., scenario methodology and
autobiographical narrative), we feel conﬁdent that this limitation of
the autobiographical narrative methodology has had no signiﬁcant ef-
fect on our ﬁndings.
Another important issue that must be addressed is that we only
focused on a speciﬁc type of transgression, that is, anger-provoking
transgressions. Victims can respond to transgressions in a number of
differentways, not onlywith anger but also, for instance, with contempt
and estrangement (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; McCullough et al., 1997).
We focused on anger-provoking transgressions because anger is con-
ceptualized as an emotion that can drive reconciliation (Fischer &
Roseman, 2007). As such, the apology–forgiveness cycle seems tomain-
ly refer to anger-inducing transgressions. Yet, studying how reconcilia-
tion can be achieved after contempt-inducing transgressions would be
an interesting extension of the apology–forgiveness cycle. Indeed, after
unintentional contempt-inducing transgressions, forgiveness may not
follow as the victims are unwilling to reconcile.
On the methodological side, we relied on two different items in
our analyses of our main dependent variable: one for victims and
one for perpetrators. Although a direct comparison between the
means on these different items (i.e., comparing perpetrator's and
victim's need for apologies after intentional or unintentional trans-
gressions) was important for testing our proposed mismatch, this
might be problematic because these were in fact two different
items. Nevertheless, by looking only at the data pattern within the
victim and perpetrator conditions, it is clear that intentionality inﬂu-
ences the need for apologies of victims and perpetrators in opposite
directions. Since these effects are in line with our hypotheses, we
feel conﬁdent that this comparison across the different items does
not pose a serious threat to the validity of our ﬁndings.
A ﬁnal limitation of the current set of studies is the absence of be-
havioral data after experimentally induced transgressions. Although
this would be an important extension of the current ﬁndings, there
are some important ethical and methodological problems with such
a design. We can experimentally create unintentional and intentional
transgressions with the participants as victims. However, creating sit-
uations in which participants are the perpetrators presents important
challenges due to the rather active role of a perpetrator compared to
the passive role of a victim (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). From a practical
perspective, it seems difﬁcult, if not impossible, to create situations in
which participants intentionally transgress against one another in the
lab (there are methods for creating unintentional transgressions;
Leunissen et al., 2012). Moreover, creating a situation in which one
intentionally transgresses against another individual might be ethi-
cally undesirable as this would induce a substantial amount of stress
on the research participants. Due to these considerations, we decided
to test our hypotheses in scenario and autobiographical narrative
methodologies only.
Concluding remarks
Due to the interpersonal nature of conﬂict and reconciliation be-
tween the perpetrator and the victim, apologizing is a dynamic social
process. Unfortunately, the psychological underpinnings of this dy-
namic process have not yet been investigated in much detail. Our
present results show that victims and perpetrators do not necessarily
share the same perspective regarding the function of an apology,
thereby making reconciliation efforts more difﬁcult than initially
anticipated.
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